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Abstract: Not all medical injuries are the result of negligence. In fact, most medical injuries 
are the result either of the inherent risk in the practice of medicine, or due to system errors, 
which cannot be prevented simply through fear of disciplinary action. This paper will discuss the 
differences between adverse events, negligence, and system errors; the current medical malpractice 
tort system in the United States; and review current and future solutions, including medical 
malpractice reform, alternative dispute resolution, health courts, and no-fault compensation 
systems. The current political environment favors investigation of non-cap tort reform remedies; 
investment into more rational oversight systems, such as health courts or no-fault systems may 
reap both quantitative and qualitative benefits for a less costly and safer health system.
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Introduction
Everyone wants a safer medical system. Each year, thousands of medical errors are 
made, resulting in injuries to patients who may deserve compensation.1 The chal-
lenge, however, is to design a system that compensates injury, correctly identifies 
medical error, and learns from adverse events to build systems that eliminate errors. 
In this paper, the author will (1) discuss the differences between adverse events, 
negligence, and system errors; (2) discuss the current medical malpractice tort 
system; and (3) review current and future solutions, including medical malpractice 
reform, alternative dispute resolution (ADR), health courts, and no-fault compensa-
tion systems.
Adverse events, negligence, and system errors
Adverse events vs negligence
It is important to understand one fundamental concept – there is a difference between 
adverse events and negligence. An adverse event is an injury occurring during the course 
of medical management.1 For example, Patient A has pneumonia and is prescribed 
Antibiotic X. The patient develops an unforeseeable allergic reaction to Antibiotic X, 
causing short-term kidney failure and hospitalization. This kidney injury is an adverse 
advent. This is not, however, negligence. Negligence is the failure to provide a standard 
level of care or, in other words, the delivery of substandard care. In the above scenario, 
it would have been negligence if the physician had neglected to check the chart, which 
stated that Patient A was allergic to Antibiotic X.
Dovepress
submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
Dovepress 
49
REvIEw
open access to scientific and medical research
Open Access Full Text Article
http://dx.doi.org/10.2147/IJGM.S24256International Journal of General Medicine 2013:6
Many adverse events occur in the practice of medicine, but 
relatively few are due to negligence. For example, a Harvard 
Public Health Study estimated that only 27% of adverse events 
were due to negligence.1 Medicine is not an exact science, 
and complications are an inherent feature of any procedure 
or medical intervention. For example, surgical procedures 
generally carry a 3%–4% risk of infection. Sterile techniques, 
preoperative cleansing, and prophylactic antibiotics are all 
used in an attempt to minimize infection. Nonetheless, even 
in the most capable hands and under the best of circumstances, 
infection can occur. This would be an adverse event, but not 
one due to a medical error. It would instead be a risk inherent 
in the practice of medicine. Similarly, pneumonia may result in 
a patient’s death despite him receiving the proper antibiotics, 
blood clots may develop despite administration of proper 
anticoagulation agents, and nerve injuries may result despite 
properly performed procedures.
It is important to differentiate between adverse events 
and medical errors, because punishing adverse events per se 
would have a chilling effect on treating complex conditions 
or performing difficult procedures,2–4 such as liver transplants 
or neurosurgery. It would also discourage care of high-risk 
patients with multiple comorbidities. An ideal oversight 
system would, therefore, not punish adverse events, but rather 
identify and target medical errors.
System errors versus negligence
Another important concept to understand is the difference 
between negligence and system error. Negligence, as 
discussed above, is failure to meet a standard level of care. 
It is an incorrect decision. For example, it is considered 
negligent if the standard of care for kidney failure is dialysis, 
and this is not ordered. A system error, on the other hand, 
is an occasional, simple human error. Deterrents cannot 
reduce these errors, because they are made unintentionally. 
From time to time, humans unwittingly make errors, such 
as mistaking salt for sugar when baking, mistaking an 
oxygen tank for a nitrogen tank during airplane maintenance, 
or mistaking “1.5 mg” for “15 mg” or “15 µg” when 
administering medication. This is not a decisional error, and 
so is not negligence. It is considered a system error because 
good organizations recognize the human error component 
and safeguard against it. Health care providers misread 
handwriting occasionally because they are human; however, 
a good system could reduce system errors by instituting 
computerized medication orders. Another example of 
a system safeguard is the use of ID bracelets to prevent 
confusion between patients with similar names.
According to a landmark 1999 Institute of Medicine 
paper, To Err is Human, most medical errors are the result of 
unavoidable human error, which can only be reduced through 
system changes.5 Punishment for errors will not reduce future 
errors, to ensure a safer system. It might, however, incentivize 
workers to hide rather than report these errors. An analogy 
is made to the airline industry; the operation of a health care 
system is similar to running an airport. In both cases, many 
people work together toward a common goal, and the best 
systems are those that acknowledge that, due to the human 
element, there will be occasional errors. Accordingly, the 
best systems will implement checks and rechecks in order 
to catch and contain these errors. For example, even if they 
are diligent, airline workers might occasionally mistake an 
oxygen tank for a nitrogen tank. It is not effective to punish 
workers for making these errors, as they are not the result of 
laziness or negligence, but are simply mistakes that people 
may make. A better solution would be to use different 
couplers for the two gases, so that a nitrogen tank could not be 
hooked up in place of an oxygen tank. The safest systems are 
those that acknowledge human error and build in safeguards 
on a systemic level.
Negligence is actually rarely present in most alleged 
cases of medical malpractice.6 In one study in New York, 
adverse events were reported in 3.7% of all hospitalizations. 
In over 70% of these cases,1 however, no negligence was 
present. In another closed claim study performed at Harvard, 
only 15% of medical malpractice cases actually contained 
negligence.6 And in a 2005 Congressional Report, over 
80% of malpractice cases reviewed actually contained no 
negligence.8 One explanation for this is that health care 
providers, from medical assistants to nurses to physicians, 
tend to be highly motivated individuals.5 Rather than being 
motivated by money, most health care practitioners tend to 
be motivated by professional or moral ideals to deliver high 
quality care and to “do no harm.” As such, negligence is not 
usually at the heart of most medical errors.
It is important to differentiate between system errors and 
negligence errors to identify those errors that can be deterred 
through the legal system (negligence) and those errors that 
can be reduced only with system safeguards (system errors). 
A rational oversight system will devote more energy towards 
preventing the more commonly made errors.
The current medical malpractice  
tort system
Currently, in the United States, medical errors are prosecuted 
under the tort system. The tort system seeks to deter 
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negligence by monetarily punishing negligent providers 
and compensating the injured parties with those monies. 
According to Prosser and Keeton on Torts the goals of the 
litigation system are to (1) compensate plaintiffs injured 
by negligence; (2) discourage the practice of negligence; 
and (3) exact corrective justice.9 A classic application of 
the tort system is deterrence of known product dangers by 
corporations. For example, if ABC Motor Company has 
knowledge that a gas tank is positioned in a precarious 
location, and yet chooses to continue production of this 
vehicle, injured parties will likely sue ABC Motor Company 
for their negligent practice. If a verdict is issued in favor of 
the plaintiffs, the goals of tort will be served. The plaintiffs 
will be compensated for their injuries, ABC will be deterred 
from similar future negligent behavior, and justice will be 
served, at least monetarily.
Some important limitations must be understood here. 
First, the litigation system can only deter negligence and 
compensate patients for injuries attributable to negligence. 
This means that the majority of patients experiencing adverse 
events will have no recourse through the litigation system. 
Consider that only 27% of adverse events occur through 
medical error, and that only a fraction of those medical errors 
are attributable to negligence, and it is quickly apparent that 
very few patients who experience adverse events will be 
entitled to compensation.1 This, however, does not prevent 
them from suing. Many patients sue when there is injury, 
failing to understand the fundamental differences between 
an adverse event and a medical error, or the difference 
between system errors and true negligence. The result is an 
overwhelming amount of time and money spent on fruitless 
litigation that serves neither to compensate the injured 
patient nor to improve the health care system. Over 60% 
of all filed lawsuits in medical malpractice cases end up 
summarily dismissed as having no grounds to even have 
been filed in the first place.4 And, according to a claim trend 
analysis from malpractice insurers, less than 1% of all filed 
medical malpractice claims actually end up in a verdict for the 
plaintiff.10 Even in these cases, most of the award is actually 
consumed by the attorney and administrative costs.7,11 So of 
the $76 to $126 billion spent each year in the United States 
on medical malpractice litigation,12 very little actually ends 
up truly compensating the patient. In other words, litigation 
is expensive and inefficient.
Second, the medical field is different from the business 
world. Most business decisions are driven by a cost-benefit 
analysis. Without the threat of lawsuits, it is possible that 
a cost-benefit analysis would favor the introduction of 
marketable yet unsafe products. The tort system in such 
situations helps create a safer society by increasing the 
“cost” side of the analysis, and discouraging the production 
of unsafe products. Health care providers, however, are not 
trained to engage in cost-benefit analysis. Rather, physicians 
are driven by professional ethics to first “do no harm” and 
second to heal the patient. According to the 1999 Institute 
of Medicine report, To Err is Human, physicians as a group 
are already ethically motivated to avoid negligent behavior, 
and the threat of litigation does not add to this motivation.5 
Instead, litigation has a negative effect on physician behavior. 
On a personal level, it creates an environment of fear and 
anxiety, disrupting the physician–patient relationship and 
causing physicians to fear patients as potential litigants. 
On a societal level, litigation causes physicians to practice 
defensive behaviors and avoid offering high-risk services, 
such as obstetrics or neurosurgery. Both situations are 
undesirable.
A more rational system would focus more on the goals of 
compensation and improvement, rather than on punishment 
for those who err. Reform efforts have been largely focused 
on trying to make the medical malpractice system more 
efficient. The main goal over the past 30 years has been to 
eliminate frivolous lawsuits, either by reducing the incentive 
to sue or by making it less likely for an unfounded suit to 
prevail.
Recent reform efforts
Caps on noneconomic damages
The first generation of tort reform efforts began in the 
mid-1970s, with the placement of caps on noneconomic 
damages in medical malpractice cases. Caps on noneconomic 
damages are monetary limits on the amount of money that 
can be awarded by a jury for injuries that are not economic 
in nature. Economic damages are damages that are readily 
calculated, such as medical expenses or lost wages. For 
example, if a patient whose salary is $50,000 per year loses 
three working years to injury, the lost wages are $150,000. 
This is an economic injury, and there is no limit or cap on this 
type of economic damage. Noneconomic damages are much 
more difficult to calculate, and therefore, more contentious 
in court. It is difficult, for example, to place a dollar value on 
“pain and suffering” or “loss of consortium” with a spouse. 
From a trial lawyer’s perspective, much of the value of a 
case comes from the noneconomic damages. There are two 
reasons for this. First, lawyers often work on billable hours. 
A trial lasting three years, therefore, will generate more fees 
than a trial lasting only one year. Gray or nebulous items are 
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often fought over for long periods during trial, so difficult 
terms, such as “pain and suffering,” naturally extend the 
life of a trial. Indeed, a RAND corporation analysis of cases 
before and after implementation of caps on noneconomic 
damages shows that trial times were reduced from three 
years to one year after implementation of caps in California.13 
In other words, noneconomic damages generate increased 
attorney fees. Second, the potential value of the case is greater 
with noneconomic damages. When a lawyer assesses a case, 
the potential value of the jury verdict is calculable before the 
decision to pursue litigation. An infected total knee case might 
be thought of in terms of medical expenses for treatment of 
the infection ($10,000), as well as the months of lost wages 
while the patient is recovering from the infection ($40,000). 
The economic damages in this case would be $50,000. The 
noneconomic damages, however, are unknown, and could 
be argued to an unlimited level. A lawyer might demand, for 
example, $1 million for the pain and suffering of having to 
undergo further treatment, or not being able to consort with 
a spouse during the second recovery period. Suddenly, the 
value of each and every adverse event, whether with merit or 
not, is potentially high enough to seek litigation.
Caps on noneconomic damages originated in 1975, when 
the State of California was undergoing a medical malpractice 
crisis. A boom in the value of jury verdicts in medical 
malpractice fueled a spate of litigation against doctors for 
adverse events. This, in turn, raised malpractice insurance 
premiums. In some cases, physicians could no longer afford 
malpractice insurance, and closed their practices. In other 
cases, insurers themselves decided that physicians were 
too risky to insure, and terminated coverage. The end result 
was the loss of thousands of physicians from the health care 
workforce, which threatened California citizens’ access to 
care. An emergency session of the California legislature 
convened to address the problem, resulting in the passing of 
the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA). This 
law instituted a cap of $250,000 on noneconomic damages 
in medical malpractice cases. The results were dramatic. 
Increases in malpractice premiums slowed to one-fourth of 
that of the rest of the nation. Trials were settled in one-third 
of the time, which ironically led to more money for the 
plaintiffs, as billable hours for attorneys sharply decreased.13 
And, most interestingly, physicians actually ordered fewer 
tests and procedures. Overall medical expenditure decreased 
between 5% and 9%.14 According to Stanford economists, 
implementation of caps on a national level would result in 
savings on such defensive medicine by $83 to $151 billion 
per year.14
Caps, however, are not a complete solution. The central 
flaw of the litigation system is that it can only deter negligence. 
Since the overwhelming majority of medical injuries are not 
based in negligence, the impact of litigation reducing adverse 
events is necessarily limited. Caps on noneconomic damages 
may limit some of the inefficiency and waste of the litigation 
system, but they are still based on litigation. Similarly, caps 
do not make a safer system, just a less expensive one. Second, 
the widespread implementation of caps are likely not feasible 
politically. Caps on noneconomic damages are vigorously 
opposed by trial lawyer political action committees, which 
have given over $30 million to politicians to oppose caps 
on a national level. While caps have been passed in places 
at a state level, such as in California, Texas, and Ohio, on a 
federal level, they have been consistently blocked.15 In 2003, 
a national cap on noneconomic damages bill was supported 
by a Republican-controlled House of Representatives and 
a Republican President, but was thwarted by a unanimous 
block of Democratic Senators. More recently, the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), despite 
recommendations from the Congressional Budget Office16 
and a President Obama-appointed health care committee17 to 
include caps, was not. In fact, an earlier version of PPACA 
actually contained a protection clause for attorney fees. This 
has left many observers feeling that while effective, caps may 
not be a politically feasible means of effecting widespread 
tort reform.
Alternative dispute resolution
The second generation of tort reform involves ADR, which 
refers to any of a number of dispute resolution techniques that 
help plaintiffs and defendants resolve conflicts outside of the 
courtroom. One advantage of ADR is that it is better suited 
to adverse events than is the tort system. Litigation can only 
compensate patients who are harmed by negligence. ADR 
can potentially reach all patients who experience adverse 
events, whether due to negligence or not. For example, many 
hospitals have embraced “early apology” programs, where 
physicians and hospital administrators reach out to the injured 
patient and express sympathy about the adverse event. This 
protects the natural physician–patient relationship as well as 
encourages dialogue. Perhaps the adverse event was simply 
a known complication, which may be relayed to the patient 
who can then save time and focus their efforts on healing 
rather than pursuing litigation. Perhaps the adverse event 
was the fault of the physician; in such cases, both parties 
can agree early on that the physician was at fault and use 
time and money that would have otherwise been spent on 
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contentious litigation (most of which would go to attorneys) 
and divert the money to the plaintiff directly. Or perhaps the 
adverse event was the result of unavoidable human error, 
and investment in system safeguards needs to be made to 
avoid future events.
The most popular ADR techniques are mediation and 
arbitration, which differ in both their binding nature and 
their formality. Mediation is simply negotiation that is 
aided by an impartial mediator. It is non-binding, meaning 
that if a settlement cannot be reached, the plaintiff may 
pursue his claim in court. Arbitration is more involved. It is 
more court-like, with an arbiter hearing both sides much like 
a judge would. Similarly, there are rules for how and when 
to talk, and how to present evidence. Most importantly, it is 
binding, meaning that the judgment of the arbiter is final and 
litigation is not an option.
Mediation has had excellent success where implemented, 
both in terms of cost-containment and satisfaction for both 
parties. Two notable success stories include the mediation 
programs at Drexel and the University of Pittsburgh. 
They have reported 85% and 88% successful resolution of 
conflicts without litigation, respectively. In the case of the 
University of Pittsburgh, this led to an estimated savings 
of $1 million in the first year of implementation alone.18 
Mediation also boasts over 90% satisfaction from both 
parties.19 From the plaintiff’s perspective, mediation offers 
more flexibility than litigation, which only offers money as 
a remedy. For example, rather than just receiving money, 
plaintiffs may wish for a scholarship to be established in their 
family’s name, or would like their deceased’s story told to 
incoming nurses or medical students to help prevent similar 
adverse events in the future. Mediation often suits plaintiffs’ 
needs better, as many sue for nonmonetary reasons, such 
as the desire for disclosure of information or the desire to 
hear an apology or explanation of what went wrong. In one 
survey of plaintiffs, money was actually tertiary to these 
concerns.19 These very aspects, however, are often withheld 
in a litigious environment.
Arbitration, on the other hand, is more acrimonious and 
expensive, being more trial-like than mediation. Arbitration 
is longer and more expensive than mediation, but much 
shorter and less expensive than jury trials.18–24 Like jury 
trials, they can only offer money as a form of redress, 
eliminating the more creative and satisfying solutions 
offered in mediation. Furthermore, arbiters are criticized 
by plaintiffs and defendants alike for always seeking 
compromise, rather than justice.24 For example, even in 
a case where there is no negligence, arbiters tend to offer 
something to the plaintiff, just for the sake of compromise. 
However, arbiters do boast 100% avoidance of litigation, 
making arbitration very appealing to malpractice insurers 
and hospital systems, as even a successful defense can 
cost close to $100,000.25 One increasingly popular form 
of arbitration is the pretreatment arbitration agreement, 
where patients agree to arbitration as a condition of being 
seen in the first place. Although these have withstood 
early legal challenge,26 caution is advised before engaging 
in pretreatment arbitration agreements. First, it may be 
awkward to discuss adversarial postures during the initial 
physician–patient visit. Second, it may actually be in the 
physician’s favor to preserve the right to a jury trial. The fact 
that mediation is non-binding is probably more advantageous 
to the physician defendant than to the plaintiff. Because the 
majority of lawsuits actually do not involve negligence, 
many physicians who are sued wish for the opportunity 
to clear their name. Jury trials, after all, overwhelmingly 
result in verdicts for the physician.25 They may be forced, 
however, by their insurance carrier to accept a settlement, 
which may be less expensive and less risky than a jury trial. 
This not only may be offending to an innocent physician, 
but may have real repercussions, as all settlements are 
mandatorily reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank 
(NPDB). This affects future medical malpractice rates and 
the ability to obtain practicing privileges in other states or 
hospitals.
Another advantage of ADR is that, unlike caps on 
noneconomic damages, it is politically feasible. Neither trial 
lawyers nor politicians oppose ADR. In fact, PPACA, while 
not containing any tort reform itself, does allocate $50 million 
for research into non-cap remedies for medical malpractice 
reform. This would include ADR.
The main obstacle to ADR implementation is the 
mandatory reporting requirement of the NPDB. The NPDB, 
as discussed above, records any settlement involving a 
physician. This, however, has a chilling effect on the use of 
settlements. Consider a case where a patient develops a blood 
clot and dies after a total hip arthroplasty, despite proper 
anticoagulant use. There is no negligence in this case, but 
it is still an adverse event, and both hospital and physician 
may wish for compensation for the family. To do so would be 
an admission of guilt, since a settlement would be recorded 
against the physician in the NPDB. Thus, the physician may 
actually prefer to be sued, win the case, and have nothing 
recorded against him. This, however, would cost time and 
money, and result in no compensation for the patient’s family. 
One possible solution to this problem would be to create an 
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exception to the mandatory NPDB reporting requirement, 
where reporting of non-negligent settlement agreements are 
not required.
Health courts
Health courts are specialized tribunals where medical 
malpractice cases would be decided by medically savvy 
judges or tribunals rather than juries. They would be similar 
to Workman’s Compensation courts, which take normal 
injury claims out of the tort system and put them into the 
administrative system. The concept of health courts has 
recently been revived by the Harvard School of Public Health 
as a means of deterring frivolous litigation and preventing 
miscarriages of justice.27 One problem for juries is that they 
can be confused by the difference between adverse events and 
negligence. Part of this may be due to the scientific questions 
involved in a medical case, and part of it may be due to the 
tendency of a jury to be overly swayed by a patient who invites 
sympathy. Consider, for example, the medical condition of 
cerebral palsy. Cerebral palsy is a developmental disorder 
with a varied spectrum of mental and physical impediments. 
Sometimes a cerebral palsy patient is so impaired that he is 
wheelchair bound, incapable of speech, and totally dependent 
on others for activities of daily living. Such a condition may 
be sympathy-evoking, but may not be caused by birthing 
trauma. According to a joint study by the American Academy 
of Pediatricians and the American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists, the “vast majority” of cerebral palsy 
cases originate in utero, well before childbirth. One trial 
lawyer in North Carolina, however, was very successful at 
confusing jurors about the true underlying medical issues, 
focusing their attention instead on the plight of the patients 
and their burdened families, and won over 30 multimillion 
dollar verdicts, including one $23 million judgment for 
what is essentially a naturally occurring and unpreventable 
condition.3 Health courts would likely not be swayed by such 
tactics, and knowing this, even unethical trial lawyers would 
likely not invest their time in such frivolous lawsuits. This 
would reduce the burden of litigation on the medical system, 
and perhaps (similar to caps on noneconomic damages) 
reduce the amount of defensive medical expenditure.
Another advantage of health courts are that, like ADR, 
they are politically feasible. Health courts have already been 
specifically and publicly endorsed by both Democrats and 
Republicans.28 President Obama, who resisted even his own 
health care committee’s recommendation17 for caps as a 
means of significant national savings, has already appropriated 
$50 million for investigation into health courts.29
The main obstacle to implementation of health courts is 
legal theory. Several constitutional issues have been raised 
about the legitimacy of health courts30 based on constitutional 
rights to jury trial and claims that creation of such courts 
overreach Congressional power. These claims have not been 
worked out specifically for health courts, but the recent Supreme 
Court decision regarding PPACA likely extrapolates authority 
for Congress to create health courts through the Commerce 
Clause. And, similar to Workman’s Compensation, there likely 
is enough of a public interest in swift and expert adjudication 
of medical malpractice issues to remove them from jury trials. 
However, these issues still have to be adjudicated.
No-fault compensation
Several countries overseas have taken the administrative 
question one step further, and created no-fault compensation 
schedules for medical malpractice injuries.31 New Zealand, 
Sweden, and Denmark have replaced litigation altogether with 
administrative compensation systems, where patients who 
sustain an avoidable medical injury can apply directly, without 
an attorney, for compensation. An expert medical panel 
reviews the case and decides on compensation. There are two 
enlightened features in these systems. First, compensation can 
be given to the injured parties even without finding fault or 
negligence. This immediately broadens the scope of patients 
who are entitled to compensation, a fundamental improvement 
over negligence. Second, information from claims is used to 
analyze opportunities for system improvements. Thus, there is an 
acknowledgement that most medical errors are actually system 
errors, as well as the determination of mechanisms to seek 
system improvements. In this way, no-fault compensation 
systems are the most rational compensation systems currently 
available: there is acknowledgement that most adverse events 
are not the result of negligence, so compensation is not tied to 
finding of fault; there is an inherent understanding that most 
errors made in medicine are system errors, which allows the 
oversight system to actually flow into efforts to create safer 
systems; and both juries and attorneys are eliminated from 
decision making, leading to more expert adjudication and more 
efficient delivery of compensation to the actual plaintiffs.
Two foreseeable obstacles remain in the implementation 
of no-fault compensation. First, the same legal legitimacy 
objections raised against health courts would likely be raised 
against no-fault compensation systems. Second, these may 
prove to be politically non-feasible. If trial lawyer interests 
vigorously oppose caps on damages, they would certainly 
oppose removal of attorneys altogether from the medical 
malpractice oversight system. Still, there may be precedents 
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that mitigate both arguments. Several states have instituted 
no-fault compensation systems in the arena of automobile 
accidents, removing these from the tort system altogether. 
Even if Motorist A is completely at fault for damaging 
Motorist B, Motorist B may not sue for damages in some 
states simply because these states wished to clear these 
cases from the administrative dockets of their courtrooms. 
A much stronger public interest exists in removing medical 
malpractice cases from tort to no-fault compensation 
schedules for plaintiffs, health care practitioners, and society 
as a whole. Plaintiffs gain because a wider group of patients 
can find compensation, a greater percentage of funds can go 
to the actual parties, and claims are processed faster than with 
litigation. Physicians gain because they are not being sued 
and can focus on providing better care rather than engaging 
in defensive practices. The nation gains because data can 
be collected to identify system shortcomings to build safer 
systems, rather than spending over $100 billion12 per year 
on litigation that mostly goes to attorneys.
Summary
Only a fraction of medical injuries actually arise from 
negligence. Most injuries either result from system errors, or 
are inherent risks in the practice of medicine. Compensation 
for such injuries, therefore, cannot rationally come from 
the tort system, which compensates only for errors arising 
from negligence. A more rationale form of compensation 
would move away from blame-based systems, such as tort 
and medical malpractice, which are costly and inefficiently 
compensate patients, and would instead move toward more 
compensation-based systems, such as ADR and no-fault 
systems. The current political environment favoring 
investigation of non-cap tort reform remedies, and investment 
into more rational oversight systems, such as health courts or 
no-fault systems, may reap both quantitative and qualitative 
benefits for less costly and safer health systems.
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